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ABSTRACT 
 
This case study describes the sequence of events that led to the establishment of MetalSpectrum, a digital marketplace for 
the exchange of non-ferrous metals.  Compared to the historical establishment of the London Metal Exchange, 
MetalSpectrum was created for the purpose of redefining the way non-ferrous metals were bought and sold.  The case study 
examines how established companies seek to respond to the threat imposed by disruptive technologies like the Internet.  
Also critical success factor underlying the success of the Internet venture are discussed in the context of the period marked 
by the Internet frenzy of 1999-2001. 
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1.  CASE SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this case is to introduce students to the area 
of business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce – particularly, 
digital marketplaces.  This is an important area of study 
since all organizations will have to decide how they will 
operate in the new digital marketplaces that will develop – 
whether by building a private or public trading exchange, 
joining a consortium, or simply deciding which 
marketplace to partner with in its industry. This case 
focuses on the creation of a high-profile digital 
marketplace in the nonferrous metals industry called 
MetalSpectrum.  The case allows a detailed discussion of 
the reasons driving the creation of digital marketplaces, the 
IT infrastructure required to support them, and the 
competitive and organizational challenges that must be 
overcome for them to be successful.  The case also 
provides a fascinating look into the Internet frenzy that 
gripped corporate America during the 1999-2001 
timeframe.   The fact that Fortune 100 companies could 
feel threatened by Internet startups provides the backdrop 
for a discussion on how established companies decide to 
address the challenges brought about by disruptive 
technologies, like the Internet. The case allows an 
examination of the options available to an organization 
when the assumptions underlying a business model turn 
out to be wrong.  Finally, the case provides the context in 
which to discuss the future of digital marketplaces and to 
speculate on how they may develop in the future.  
 
2.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Early November 2000 in a conference room at the 
MetalSpectrum headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, Eric 
Bassel, Vice-President of Operations, reflected on how far 
the company had come in such a short period of time.   
MetalSpectrum was a B2B digital marketplace formed by a 
consortium of eight major players in the non-ferrous metal 
industry to buy and sell copper, aluminum, nickel, lead, 
zinc and tin. In less than six months, the company had 
achieved significant milestones in 2000: a May 2nd press 
release announcing the formation of the consortium; the 
hiring of the first employees in June; the soft launch of the 
Web site on September 12; and the full launch of the first 
version of the digital marketplace on October 16.  Bassel, a 
former employee of Alcoa, the world’s leading producer of 
aluminum, first proposed the idea of the digital 
marketplace and was involved with the creation of 
MetalSpectrum from the very beginning. Although 
MetalSpectrum was proceeding on schedule, Bassel knew 
that many uncertainties existed. Would a merger with a 
major competitive B2B site make sense? What was the 
appropriate fee structure for participants in the 
marketplace? Was the marketplace responding to e-
commerce as quickly as needed to prove the concept valid 
and thus keep the support of the consortium partners?  
Would the partners stay the course if MetalSpectrum didn’t 
hit its revenue numbers and needed more cash?  
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3.  BEGINNING OF THE IDEA 
 
By the spring of 1999, senior executives at Alcoa were 
aware of the changes that were being brought about by the 
Internet.  One hundred twenty-five years ago, when the 
London Metal Exchange came into being, some of the 
metal producers were slow to respond to the changes 
created by this revolutionary way to buy and sell products. 
Alcoa didn’t want the same thing to happen again.  
Already, two US-based digital markets had been 
established to buy and sell steel, namely MetalSite4 and e-
STEEL5, and a third, Metique, which was based in the 
United Kingdom.  As a result, a team consisting of fifteen 
Alcoa employees and consultants from Boston Consulting 
Group was formed to develop an e-strategy for Alcoa. This 
group was led by the president of the e-business group at 
Alcoa. At a meeting in November 1999, in a crowded 
room at Chicago O’Hare airport, the team identified 25 
possible e-business initiatives. By March 2000, the concept 
of a consortium-owned, multi-metal marketplace had 
emerged as a major investment opportunity for the Alcoa 
e-business group -- the one that the group believed had the 
most potential to develop into a viable business and the 
one that would bring the most value to the entire industry.   
Bassel commented on how Alcoa came to this conclusion: 
“If Alcoa is going to build and operate only 
alcoa.com, then all their competitors are going 
to build their own sites. Buyers will have to 
integrate into each separate site. The industry 
will have a new tool called the Internet, but the 
industry will continue to have to deal with the 
same integration issues that it has with EDI 
today.  If this is the way it develops, it will be 
really sad for the industry. We will be no further 
along than before we had the Internet and the 
industry will not be getting the savings that it 
needs.  We all believe that there is value to be 
created in this industry by working together.  If 
we can do something for the industry that allows 
us to pass efficiency savings on the customer, 
everyone wins.” 
 
A Boston Consulting Group team member remarked: 
“If suppliers in the metals industry could make 
e-commerce go away, they would. But absent the 
ability to do that, creating a supplier-based 
consortium was a good hedge against the 
emergence of a powerful e-commerce 
intermediary arising. For that reason, Alcoa 
                                                 
1 MetalSite, established in 1997, was the first virtual 
auction site for selling steel. Producers would post their 
inventories for auction and pay the site a small percentage 
of the transaction value. Founded by Weirton Steel 
Corporation, it is owned by steel producers. 
 
2 e-Steel emerged as a competitor to MetalSite in 1999.  
Based in New York and backed by venture capitalists, the 
new e-marketplace was launched as a neutral site where 
sellers and buyers could negotiate deals for steel in private. 
took the lead in creating this consortium. They 
set money aside to pay for the feasibility study 
and funded a group of people to start pursuing 
the establishment of the consortium. We put 
together a business model for the consortium 
that was very simple. I don’t think you can 
invest a whole lot of time making very complex 
predictions about a future that none of us had 
any clue as to how it would play out.” 
 
4.  SELLING THE CONCEPT 
 
Once it had been decided that the digital marketplace had 
to include more companies than just Alcoa and more 
metals than aluminum, Kim Fields, a Boston Consulting 
Group employee at the time and now Vice President for 
Business Development at MetalSpectrum, was given the 
responsibility to identify and sign up other suppliers to be 
members of the consortium.  The choice of suppliers in 
turn would be influenced by the metal markets to be 
represented in the digital marketplace. It was decided to 
focus on those metals that customers buy day in and day 
out – copper, stainless, brass, titanium, and nickel. The top 
five suppliers within each metal, along with a distributor, 
were identified and Fields set out to convince them to join 
the consortium.  Fields explains how she sold the concept: 
“When we began to talk to potential partners in 
March 2000, e-commerce was just starting to 
get on people’s radar.  Everyone knew that they 
would have to make a decision on how they were 
going to participate in these emerging digital 
marketplaces or risk being left behind. I pointed 
out to them that their customers already had 
some choices for buying on-line that had been 
created by third parties (i.e., MetalSite and e-
STEEL.) I asked them if they wanted a powerful 
third party to stand between them and their 
customers and to dictate the terms by which they 
would interact with them. By joining 
MetalSpectrum, they would have an opportunity 
to have some say in this inevitable change. 
Otherwise, they would have to play by whatever 
rules were set up. If they believed that there was 
a chance that at least one of these digital 
marketplaces would succeed, it would be better 
to play, than to not play;  it would be better to 
own part of it than to not own part of it; and on 
the margin, they would both help it succeed and 
help it be more balanced in how it represents 
both buyers and sellers.” 
 
Based on this argument, Fields was able to convince eight 
metal producers and distributors to join as partners in the 
consortium. Partners were either founders or charter 
members. Founders were offered equity and a board seat. 
Charter members were only offered equity. The 
distribution of equity was based primarily on the initial 
contribution of resources (both capital and manpower) to 
the construction of the site. In addition, a pool of variable 
equity was set-aside to be earned through active 
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participation in the digital marketplace.  About twenty 
percent of MetalSpectrum’s equity was reserved for the 
company’s employees.  Caps on the equity were put in 
place in order to ensure that no one partner would have a 
majority share.  
 
A key concern expressed by potential partners was their 
ability to maintain their brand and prevent commodization 
of their products if they were sold on the digital 
marketplace. No one, including Alcoa, wanted to compete 
just on the basis of cost.  Fields commented on how she 
addressed this problem with potential partners:  
“I pointed out to them that MetalSpectrum is 
just another channel to your customers – one 
where people are buying multiple metals and 
finding value in getting all of their purchases at 
one site.  Within MetalSpectrum, you still have 
to compete on quality and on-time delivery 
because those are the things that really matter.” 
 
Another contentious issue involved exclusivity. Each 
partner was required to agree to only participate in the 
MetalSpectrum digital marketplace.  No one wanted to 
agree to that, including Alcoa. However, in order to build 
sufficient liquidity to support the marketplace, it was 
critical that all partners direct their business to this one site.   
 
5.  GETTING STARTED 
 
In the beginning, the Board of Directors drawn from the 
initial group of eight partners was very active in the 
business – meeting every two weeks and making all day-
to-day operating decisions for the consortium.  In addition 
to cash, each partner was required to commit high-level 
employees who had the specific skills necessary to get the 
new company up and running. Included in this group were 
chief technology officers, vice-presidents of business 
development, and directors of sales and marketing.  All 
together, there were approximately 60 people assigned 
from the member organizations to the start-up phase.  
 
During the last week of April 2000, the group met to 
choose the name of the company (MetalSpectrum), to 
decide on where the headquarters was to be located 
(Atlanta),  approve a logo, select a technology partner 
(Ariba and I2), and approve the press release that was 
distributed on  May 2, 2000 announcing the formation of 
the company.  On June 1, 2000, the first MetalSpectrum 
employee was hired.  During the second through the 
fourteenth day of June, the governance issues for 
MetalSpectrum were resolved and member agreements 
signed.  On June 14, 2000, MetalSpectrum was 
incorporated.  The members committed funding for one 
year.  By November 2000, the members included: Alcoa, 
Allegheny Technologies, Castle Metals, Chase Copper & 
Brass, Kaiser Aluminum, North American Stainless, Olin 
Copper & Brass, Pechiney Aluminum, Outokumpu Copper 
& Brass, Reynolds Aluminum, Thyssen/Mexinox, TW 
Metals, and Vincent Metal Goods.  There were 70 
MetalSpectrum employees. 
6.  THE BUSINESS MODEL 
 
The MetalSpectrum offerings were standard, non-ferrous 
metals that customers buy on a daily basis.  There were no 
major competitors in that market space in 2000. 
Furthermore, the market for non-ferrous materials was 
highly concentrated, consisting of only a few very large 
suppliers of aluminum, copper, and stainless steel.  This 
meant that liquidity would be relatively easy to achieve 
and the shelves for the full product line could be filled very 
quickly.  
 
The value proposition for the members was built around 
the equity given to them, the increased liquidity of the 
metals, the cost reductions that were possible by reducing 
supply-chain transaction costs, and the fact that all of the 
buyers and sellers would be in one place.  Although the 
members received the lion’s share of the value proposition 
by holding equity in the company, the revenue model 
required that members pay for all transactions, with the 
exception of auctions, which required buyers to pay.  In the 
beginning, the pricing system was very simple. Sellers 
were charged a fixed percentage of the transaction amount.  
However, after learning how the members sold their 
products, it become clear that this simple approach would 
not work.  The amount of the transaction fee needed to be 
based on the specific type of metal traded and the volume 
of trades transacted.  For buyers, the fee needed to be 
based on the type of auction. 
 
It was estimated that the market for metals in the United 
States was somewhere in the order of a hundred billion 
dollars and that  between 25 and 50 percent of that would 
go online in the next five years. Assuming that 
MetalSpectrum could capture one percent of that market, 
there was a five hundred million dollar potential 
opportunity. With a 1% fee, the potential revenue was 5 
million dollars.   Bassel remarked: 
“We initially thought that we would charge 
each member one percent of the dollar 
volume that each generated on the Web site 
up to a maximum amount.  That drew 
tremendous fire from the members. They did 
not like being charged. They thought that the 
pricing policy was unfair since it cut into 
their profit margin. Even though the members 
have an investment in this company and want 
a return on their investment, the purpose of 
their participation is to generate their own 
revenues and see an increased sales volume -- 
not to have their profit margin cut by giving 
us a full percent of the transaction dollar 
amount.”  
 
MetalSpectrum was in the process of reevaluating how to 
generate revenues on the site. Should they charge the 
partners a percentage of each transaction, a subscription 
fee, or flat fee per transaction?  How could the pricing be 
set so that the suppliers would know how much it actually 
cost them to do business on the site? 
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Complicating the pricing decision was another factor. 
When a supplier decides to invest in MetalSpectrum, it is 
the corporate office that makes the investment. However, it 
is an individual business unit that winds up paying for the 
cost of selling product on the Web site. Fields remarked on 
this mismatch: 
“I’d sit there with an executive from an 
individual business unit saying, “These are not 
high fees and your company has got the equity.” 
They would come back and say, “You’ve got to 
lower your fees, because the fees are coming out 
of my budget. The investment was made by 
corporate.  I don’t care if this equity is worth 
five hundred million dollars right now. I am the 
one paying one percent on my sales volume. I 
don’t want to do that.” 
 
By November 2000, MetalSpectrum had close to eighty 
registered companies doing business on the Web site and 
close to $900,000 worth of metal sales had gone through 
the site. Their goal was to have five thousand companies 
registered by the end of the 2001. Their long-term goal was 
to have over 100,000 companies registered on the site, 
which represented about 25% of the market. 
MetalSpectrum projected that it would be profitable by the 
first quarter of 2002. It was anticipated that break-even 
would be reached by September 2001. However, 
MetalSpectrum would continue to need a cash infusion to 
keep them going through the first quarter of 2002.  
 
7.  THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
The choice of the software technology provider came 
down to either Ariba/I2 or Oracle.  Alcoa was partial to 
Oracle because they had standardized on the Oracle 
platform throughout their organization.  Choosing Oracle 
to build the digital marketplace would definitely have 
made it easier for Alcoa to integrate its own systems with 
the digital marketplace. In the end, however, software 
providers Ariba and I2 were selected because it was 
believed that their technology could provide most of the 
functionality required. Of particular importance was their 
ability to handle a more complicated catalogue whereby 
metals could be described by a range of attributes instead 
of just a standard SKU.   
 
Work on building the digital marketplace began shortly 
after the March meeting of the founding members.  During 
April and May, teams of individuals from the various 
member organizations began working on requirements. 
These teams were organized by function – a catalogue 
group, a commercial group, a registration group, and a 
content and community group. These teams defined such 
things as how a catalogue should work, how an auction 
should work, how an RFQ should work, and how to 
interpret purchase orders. After analyzing the requirements 
in great depth, the groups began to compare the 
requirements to the functionality of the Ariba and I2 
products. On June 1, Arthur Andersen joined the team as 
the systems integrator to help with this task. The analysis, 
which was presented to the board on July 5, identified 
significant gaps. The CTO described for the board the 
work that would need to be done for Version 1 and then for 
Version 2 when more functionality in the Ariba and I2 
products would become available.  
 
In order to meet the soft launch date of September 12, 
2000, several different software development teams from 
Ariba, I2, and Arthur Andersen needed to work in parallel. 
In all, there were five teams of 80 people working in the 
United States in Mountain View (CA), Dallas, Tampa, 
Atlanta, and Chicago. One team worked on integrating 
modules between the Ariba product and the I2 product. 
Other groups worked on extending the functionality in 
Ariba and I2 to encompass the special requirements of 
selling metals. And a group in India worked on developing 
content for the Web site and creating the metals catalogue.  
For much of the time, the development groups worked 
with beta code.  Significant customization using Java 
Server Pages (JSP) was required in order for the Ariba/I2 
products to fit the requirements of the Web site.  
 
In May, the CTO designed the IT organization that would 
be needed to support the digital marketplace once it went 
into production.  Knowing what the final state would be to 
support the site, the CTO looked for opportunities to hire 
individuals on the development team that would later 
become permanent employees.  By December 2000, the 
burn rate for the Arthur Andersen consultants was about 
half of what it was in the August/September time frame.  It 
was anticipated that a number of Arthur Andersen 
consultants would still be needed through the release of 
Version 2 in order to support the continued building of site 
functionality 
 
8.  THE SOFT LAUNCH 
 
On September 12, 2000 the member organizations 
participated in the soft launch at MetalSpectrum  
headquarters.  The soft launch enabled the members to see 
for the first time how the digital marketplace actually 
worked.  No training was provided to the members. The 
members, some playing the role of suppliers and others 
playing the role of buyers, were assigned to separate 
offices all over the building and told to conduct 
transactions with real money. For anti-trust reasons, 
members could not talk to each other.  The trading lasted 
for 3 days.   MetalSpectrum received valuable feedback 
from this exercise. Bassel described the situation: 
“None of us had seen all of the components of 
the Web site work together since separate 
groups had worked on different modules like 
registration, auctioning and negotiation. Once 
we started trading, I was horrified – it was so 
ugly! But all of us recognized the potential for a 
powerful selling tool.” 
 
The members told them that the system was too 
complicated and confusing. They wanted the processes 
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such as registration to be simpler and they wanted the 
terminology to be more “metal-like.” In all, they identified 
400 items that needed to be improved.   The launch date 
for Version 1 was moved back two weeks to October 16, 
2000 in order to give the development team time to fix 
these problems. Over the next month, the development 
team worked night and day to fix the majority of the 
problems. 
 
9.  GOING LIVE 
 
The digital marketplace opened for registration on 
September 29, 2000 and by October 16, 2000 Version 1 
was up and running. Version 1 delivered basic 
functionality. Basic transactions such as request for quote 
could be provided by the Web site and simple auctions 
could be conducted.  Bassel commented on this version: 
“Version 1 is still woefully inadequate.  Our 
sales representatives are pounding the pavement 
trying to get people to do business on our Web 
site. However, since the site doesn’t have a lot of 
functionality, it has little to offer them. So 
there’s our dilemma. Do we introduce customers 
to the Web site before it’s really able to meet 
their needs and run the risk of turning them off 
and having to go back and convince them to try 
it again in six months when we have more 
functionality? Or do we want to wait to go after 
those customers?” 
 
MetalSpectrum planned to adopt a six month cycle for 
major revisions, with Version 2 scheduled to be released in 
April 2001.  However, sub-releases that contained 
significant enhancements were also planned. Version 1.5 
was scheduled to be released in December 2000. This 
version would include a re-designed registration process 
and new pricing tables for copper, aluminum, and stainless.  
 
Pricer, which was an I2 software feature for dynamically 
determining prices, would be included in Version 2 for 
those that wished to use it.  Some of the members had been 
waiting for this functionality, but others already had other 
methods of generating prices and would not use this 
feature.  The biggest challenge was identifying what was 
most important for the whole group. The Board of 
Directors played an important role in helping to steer the 
development of the digital marketplace in the ways that 
were most meaningful to the whole.   
 
Being able to support a high level of integration was at the 
heart of the value proposition for MetalSpectrum.   By 
incorporating standardized formats for purchase orders, 
invoices, and statements using XML into Version 2, 
MetalSpectrum would play the key role of translator 
between suppliers and buyers. Suppliers would not have to 
link into the individual systems of hundreds of different 
customers, and each one of those customers would not 
have to link into hundreds of different suppliers.  However, 
the true value of integration would only be achieved when 
the back-end systems of suppliers, distributors, and 
customers could be integrated together – a true virtual 
supply chain.  Business process engineers from 
MetalSpectrum would be available to work with customers 
to help achieve this level of integration.  The ability to 
integrate into the inventory management systems of 
suppliers was planned for Version 3.  Also planned for the 
future was the ability to interoperate with other digital 
marketplaces such as Covisint6.  The Web site was hosted 
by a third party.  The process of moving the Web site to 
this host site began in late August.   The Chief Technology 
Officer explained the process: 
“We would bring in the code from various teams 
and we’d test it in the new site. Then we would 
bring in some more and test it. We did that for 
about a week.  And we started hooking the 
pieces together and testing them in an integrated 
fashion.  We only had about two and a half 
weeks to accomplish this.   Those were difficult 
nights trying to get everybody on the same page 
as we took all these disparate pieces tested them 
in their individual teams and brought them 
together.”  
 
10. BUYING AND SELLING IN A DIGITAL 
MARKETPLACE 
 
In general, the current process of buying and selling metals 
is cumbersome, convoluted, time-consuming and costly. 
Suppliers/distributors usually have large inside sales 
departments with the sales force on fixed salaries. A 
customer wishing to buy metal from a supplier/distributor 
typically would go through the following steps: 
 
1. Type a request for quote (RFQ) 
2. Fax it to salespersons from several different 
suppliers/distributors 
3. Wait for a response 
4. Compare the responses manually 
5. Re-fax for clarification 
6. Pick up the phone and call 
7. And then repeat beginning with step 2 
 
On the other side, the salesperson receives the RFP and 
asks himself several questions: 
1. How much business do I conduct with this 
company?  
2. Do they have a particular price sheet? If so, am I 
going to use the price sheet or do I actually think 
that competitive conditions are such that I need 
to be more aggressive? 
3. What’s my inventory position in this product? 
 
The new process of buying and selling in a digital 
marketplace as compared to the traditional process would 
be smoother, faster, and less costly. By automating many 
of the tasks that were done now, buyers would have the 
opportunity to develop more meaningful relationships with 
the suppliers/distributors’ salespersons. Three different 
                                                 
3 www.covisint.com  
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selling processes were provided within MetalSpectrum:  
catalogue, RFQ, and auction. 
• On-line catalogue purchasing allows a buyer to 
view the catalogue for multiple suppliers and to 
combine items from multiple catalogs into a 
single purchase. A request for quote allows a 
group of suppliers to be contacted electronically 
simultaneously to request quotes on specified 
items.  Approved quotes are then converted to 
purchase orders.  
• RFQ purchasing involved preparing a document 
listed items to be purchased. 
• Auctions enable buyers to bid in real-time on a 
list of items specified by a supplier. Auctions 
were not a general way of doing business in the 
metals industry. Reverse auctions enable 
suppliers to bid in real-time on a list of items 
specified by a buyer.  MetalSpectrum allowed 
for buyers to participate in several different types 
of reverse auctions. One reverse auction used 
standard rules. According to these rules, a 
supplier had to specify a reservation price. At the 
closing time, the auction gives the business to 
the lowest bidder.  However, feedback from 
buyers caused MetalSpectrum to make available 
a reverse auction where buyers could select the 
winning bid based on attributes such as quality, 
after sale service, and delivery time in addition to 
cost.  
 
MetalSpectrum realized that buyers and suppliers were 
unfamiliar with using the auction process provided in the 
digital marketplace.  To help the participants use this 
process, they created a customer support team called the 
Market Maximizer.  This team would walk the participants 
through every part of the auction process, watching over 
the auction as it unfolded.  If asked, they would even call 
auction invitees and offer to help them through the process.  
 
11.  LOOKING AHEAD – THE CHALLENGES 
 
By November 2000, it had become clear that the adoption 
by buyers was occurring much slower than had been 
anticipated.  If MetalSpectrum could not convince 
significant numbers of buyers that they needed to be doing 
business on-line as opposed to picking up the phone and 
calling their sales representative, then they were not going 
to succeed.  
Another reason contributing to the slow growth of the Web 
site was the fact that not enough supply was being offered 
on the Web site. Suppliers needed to move between 5-10% 
of their business to the electronic marketplace before they 
would be able to start reducing the fixed cost of their inside 
sales department. Part of the reluctance on the part of the 
supplier, at least for the short term, to utilize the Web site 
was that participation would add to the existing cost 
structure, rather than reducing it. MetalSpectrum hoped 
that the appropriate equity structure had been put in place 
so that the suppliers would accept an increase in operating 
cost until such time that enough business had moved to the 
marketplace so that they could actually take costs out of 
their operations. 
 
Training also represented a huge challenge for 
MetalSpectrum. MetalSpectrum established a customer 
development group whose responsibility was to educate 
the buyers and the suppliers so that they could navigate the 
Web site easily.  Training was viewed as an extended 
version of sales. The sales people got the buyers interested 
and got them to sign on. Then, the customer development 
group went in to help the buyer become an active 
participant in the MetalSpectrum community.   
 
Globalization of  the site represented another big 
challenge. MetalSpectrum elected to get the software 
stabilized for North America before attempting to expand 
their market elsewhere and having to provide the 
capabilities in multiple languages. MetalSpectrum saw 
itself as a “technology company” and, thus, was highly 
dependent upon the technology powering the marketplace.  
Their success depended on the technology being able to 
provide all that had been promised.  Bassel commented on 
the future and the challenges to be faced: 
“I’m so glad we got the backing of the industry 
because everybody can say that this is the future 
and in five years we are going to love it. But 
MetalSpectrum has to be around for 5 years in 
order to capitalize on this future. I think it will 
probably take that long before you see a 
significant volume going through this site.” 
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